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Sensitivity to the local political context is posited by scholars as key for enhancing 
effectiveness of transitional justice in post-conflict societies, whether it takes a 
judicial or non-judicial form. This chapter makes the case for a critical reading of 
local political constraints, warning that framing of culpability and suffering in 
collective terms leads to marginalization of very victims whose crimes are being 
aired. The chapter compares the inability of the Milošević trial to engage Kosovo 
Albanians, with the mixed reception in Kosovo received by the RECOM -- the 
regional civil society initiative aimed at documenting past crimes which emerged as a 
response to weaknesses of the retributive approach to past abuse. Both mechanisms 
falter in the encounter with the intricacies of the local context in Kosovo, where 
suffering is understood within a broader national struggle, both past and present. 
Hence, it is critical to understand from the victims’ perspective how local political 
constraints can be overcome by the pursuit of justice, rather than how they can be 
imported into the pursuit of justice. 
 
Why did the Milošević trial fail to engage the Albanian public in Kosovo? The 
reaction – really, the non-reaction – of Kosovar Albanians contradicts the usual 
explanation for the ICTY’s ineffectiveness in bringing about post-conflict justice in 
the former Yugoslavia. According to that view, many Serbs, Croats, and Bosniaks – 
and Albanians – have been loath to see their own co-nationals in the dock answering 
for acts committed in their name. Consequently, they hailed accused war criminals 
going to The Hague as heroes, dismissed the ICTY as biased – even as an 
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international conspiracy – while invoking exclusively their own suffering and 
victimhood.1 By the same token, of course, they have generally been happy to see 
their former opponents tried and convicted. Following this logic, we might have 
expected the Albanian public in Kosovo to follow closely the trial of Milošević as it 
aired his crimes, acknowledged Kosovar Albanians as victims, and established his 
culpability as the chief mastermind of their suffering? Wouldn’t his trial represent the 
long-awaited recognition of injustice? Wouldn’t the Albanians feel at least a degree of 
political, national, even historical rehabilitation? This is the paradox Trix tackles in 
her chapter: Charting Albanians’ reception and perception of Milošević’s trial in the 
Kosovar Albanian press, she concludes that they did not, and that therefore the trial 
was not a success.  
 
Plausible enough, perhaps, but why? For Trix, the answer appears in what is her most 
important observation about the Milošević trial: that the voices of the victims were not 
heard. The trial aired Milošević’s crimes, but still managed to offend his victims, not 
least because of their unacceptable treatment in the courtroom by Milošević himself, 
as well as their marginalization in the trial process. However, interweaving evidence 
constituted by the expectations Albanians had for the Milošević trial – what they 
expected the trial to do – with arguments about the trial’s procedural failings – what 
the trial did inadequately – Trix’s account remains inconclusive about where the 
answer is to be found. Is it in the realm of politics, or is it in a procedural, legal 
remedy?  
 
Such inconclusiveness has a paradoxical outcome. The political interpretation of the 
court proceedings – even if undertaken from the perspective of Albanian national 
narratives – marginalizes rather than redeems the actual victims. The individuals are 
lost in the accounts of collective suffering, for which the apparent redress lies in 
collective responsibility of the perpetrator through its proxy – here of Serbia through 
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Milošević. It, therefore, follows that even if Milošević had lived to face his verdict, 
the victims’ need for justice would not have been met. But, as we will see, this is a 
dead-end street for coming to terms with past wrongs and for prospects of 
reconciliation. The impact of the Milošević trial needs to be read in the context of 
local political constraints in Kosovo, as Trix recognizes, but the key question is how 
these can be overcome by the pursuit of justice, rather than how they can be imported, 
as she seems to desire, into the pursuit of justice. 
 
 
I. The Limits of Retributive Justice  
 
Trix’s argument is an elaborate, if implicit, critique of retributive justice, in particular 
of the idea that criminal trials, at least as they are presently conducted, are effective 
mechanisms for reckoning with war crimes and gross human rights violations. This 
view has, potentially, broader applications, for although her particular critique of the 
Milošević trial is located against its reception among Albanians in Kosovo, it also 
needs to be read in the context of global trends in ICL. These trends have made 
impunity for crimes a non-option,2 but also brought a number of challenges for the 
project of ensuring that the new default of criminal trial is also relevant and 
purposive. For example, the location of the Tribunal outside the post-conflict zone, 
with foreigners at the helm, has disempowered the local, target populations the justice 
project ostensibly serves. In the Milošević trial, the direct consequence of this has 
been a thin ear for local circumstances and sensitivities; even the built-in, linguistic 
structures of the trial – inevitable in international tribunals as they are currently 
designed3 – ensure that the personal experience of pain and suffering gets lost and 
distorted in multiple translations of witnesses’ statements.  
 
But, above all, Trix shows that trials as a transitional justice instrument are not 
primarily victim-focused. Trials center on the perpetrator, and represent a demand not 
only for accountability and acknowledgment of the harms done, but also for 
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unflinching punishment.4 Within this model, the suffering of victims becomes factive, 
instrumental of the real purpose, which is the determination of guilt. It is the kind of 
court that can conclude its forensic examination of a massacre to its own satisfaction 
with the only survivor, from the stand, declaring “‘But you haven’t asked about what I 
went through. . . !’”5 
 
Trix perceives an alternative to this defective model, invoking Adem Demaçi’s call to 
Serbs to apologize for war crimes committed during Milošević’s regime.6 Although 
Trix, a linguist, does not use the same vocabulary, this is implicitly a call for a model 
of restorative justice, and so it is pertinent to ask: Could a restorative justice 
mechanism – such as an official apology or a truth commission – avoid some of the 
pitfalls of the Milošević trial?  
  
II. The Promise of Restorative Justice? 
Restorative justice in transitional and post-conflict contexts refers to a range of non-
judicial tools including truth commissions, mass disqualifications, reparations, 
compensations, apologies as well as traditional informal practices. It is an approach to 
justice that focuses on the victims of atrocities and their needs, underpinned by a 
broader aspiration to restore social relations in the aftermath of past abuse.7 To begin 
answering the question of whether or not restorative justice offers a more appropriate 
framework for coming to terms with past wrongs, we can consider a prominent effort 
to create and operate a non-judicial, restorative justice mechanism – one whose 
structure, procedures and purposes might constitute a plausible test of the alternatives 
to formal ICL. The Regional Commission for Establishing the Facts about War 
Crimes and other Serious Human Rights Violations in former Yugoslavia, or 
RECOM, is a regional movement that has grown in direct response to the perceived 
weaknesses of attempts to seek redress for past wrongs through trials, especially at the 
ICTY. 
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 Specifically, its founders saw it as a response to selectivity of retributive models.8   
RECOM is also an intentionally local response to a complex post-conflict legacy in 
the former Yugoslavia that has been invoked as a reason for the ICTY’s 
ineffectiveness: namely the tendency of populations to view trials as an opportunity to 
emphasize and exaggerate the war crimes committed by the other side, while 
minimizing or contextualizing one’s own. RECOM is supposed to be an answer, in 
other words, to public resistance to reckoning with the past, and to glorification of 
one’s own war criminals coupled, curiously, with the neglect of victims.  
 
But here we encounter the same inconclusive paradox that appears in Milošević trial. 
For although Trix critiques the ICTY for being tone-deaf to context, even a locally 
driven initiative like RECOM confronts the political problem of context and 
perspective. Hence, for restorative justice, like for retributive justice, the biggest 
challenge is to cut through the tendency by local populations on both sides of the 
conflict to impose a collective interpretation of responsibility for crimes and gross 
human rights violations as well as for suffering.  
 
Producing valid truths across contexts is hard, but not impossible. The local context 
has to be addressed – but critically so, because it itself can stand in the way of post-
conflict justice, whether pursued by judicial or non-judicial means. The analysis of a 
restorative alternative to justice shows that the role of victims in overcoming the 
complex and ambiguous role played by the local context in transitional justice is 
critical. Their voice can be an effective answer to collective framing of culpability and 
suffering, which are conducive to perpetuating a sense of injustice and grievance. 
Placing the victims at a centre of a post-conflict justice seeking mechanism goes 
beyond counteracting their marginalization, itself a key characteristic in restorative 
attempts to achieve a sense of justice. Their authentic accounts of suffering offer a 
point of solidarity between the victims from different ethnic groups, and form a 
steppingstone for a direct dialogue on the past wrongs; thus defying presumptions that 
justice can be served only via a collective truth.  
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A. Creating a restorative alternative: Establishment and aims of the RECOM 
process 
The founding of the Coalition for RECOM in October 2008 marked the beginning of 
a regional truth-seeking process in the Western Balkans.9 The aim of the Coalition is 
to promote the creation of an officially recognized regional commission that would 
produce an accurate, objective and official account of war crimes and other grave 
human rights violations during the Yugoslav wars; this, in turn, would lead to the 
recognition of victims and their suffering, as well as prevent repetition of the crimes.10 
Since the launch of the initiative, the Coalition has grown into a grass-roots 
movement, and involves 1,818  NGOs, associations, and groups – representing 
victims and their representatives, as well as prominent individuals, veterans, lawyers, 
artists, journalists, academics, and youth – from all areas of the former Yugoslavia.11 
It has held hundreds of consultations at the regional, state, and local levels, and has 
begun an initiative to collect one million signatures across the region in support of an 
official commission.12  
 
Along with its innovative regional focus, RECOM is oriented towards victims. The 
process’ remit is deliberately narrow and factive, prioritizing facts that themselves 
speak about the context in which the crimes were committed. Not unlike the truth-
telling comissions in Latin America – such as Nunca Mas in Brazil, or the 
Argentinian and Chilean commissions13 – the Coalition aims to contribute to justice 
by establishing truth painstakingly, building up a record, witness by witness and fact 
by fact. Individual victims are to be named, rather than remaining contested, faceless 
numbers, manipulated and obfuscated in competing ethnic narratives about the recent 
                                                 
9 Nataša Kandić, The RECOM Initiative: From a Non-governmental Challenge to a State Project, 2 
FORUM FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 107, 108 (2009). 
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činjenice, VREME, 7 July 2011, http://www.vreme.com/cms/view.php?id=999449.  
13 Priscilla B. Hayner, Fifteen Truth Commissions- 1974 to 1994: A Comparative Study, 16 HUMAN 
RIGHTS QUARTERLY 597 (1994). 
conflict.14 According to Lush Krasniqi, representing the families of victims from 
Đakovica (Gjakova) in Kosovo, “RECOM must exist so that it can be proved that 
there is only one truth – a real truth and to root out Albanian truth, Croatian truth, 
Serbian, Montenegrin, Roma, Macedonian, Bosniak, Slovenian and other truths.”15 As 
this focus on “one truth” implies, the act of documenting also has broader aspirations 
that have become evident in the consultation process, such as overcoming communal 
and official denial of atrocity, creating an historical record, preventing violence and 
encouraging reconciliation, both between and within ethnic groups.  
 
While the RECOM initiative is ultimately aimed at becoming a state-run project, the 
process of consultations has itself already become a forum for airing crimes and 
acknowledging the suffering of all affected by them. In Kosovo, the consultations 
have offered an opportunity for Albanians and Serbs to engage in a dialogue 
underpinned by a shared mission to establish the truth. For example, Snežana 
Zdravković, from Udruženje porodica kidnapovanih i ubijenih na Kosovu i Metohiji 
(the Association of Kidnapped and Killed Persons in Kosovo and Metohija), 
expressed support for the Coalition “because the families of the victims thus gain an 
opportunity to speak about the victims publicly and openly, but to talk about my 
victims I ought to comprehend and understand your victims. Only then can we discuss 
and see our problem objectively.”16 Establishing the truth about the missing was also 
equated with justice: as one Albanian put it, ‘“justice could be achieved only by 
finding the last missing person and providing a proper funeral for the last body to be 
found, and only then we could be speaking of justice.”17 
 
B. RECOM encounters the local context  
                                                 
14 The RECOM projects aims to be the first comprehensive record of crimes committed on the territory 
of former Yugoslavia, as no such records exist for the First and Second World Wars. 
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KOMRA, 17 Dec. 2010. http://www.zarekom.org/Konsultime/Konsultime-me-shoqatat-e-viktimave-
dhe-familjart-e-viktimave.sq.html. 
16 Konsultime rajonale me shoqatat e viktimave dhe familjarët e viktimave mbi draft Statutin për 
KOMRA, 17 Dec. 2010. http://www.zarekom.org/Konsultime/Konsultime-me-shoqatat-e-viktimave-
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remains of the missing both on the territory in Serbia since 2002, as well as from clandestine graves in 
Kosovo. ICMP Issues Report on Missing Persons from the Kosovo Conflict, 3 March 2011. 
http://www.ic-mp.org/press-releases/kosovo-stock-taking-report/ 
Alongside these promising developments, however, the debate about the RECOM 
process, its aims, and, ultimately, its reception among Kosovar Albanians, reveal the 
challenges of meeting expectations of transitional justice in complex post-conflict 
settings. Much like the Milošević trial, the RECOM initiative’s effectiveness and 
acceptability have been criticized. Although the process has supporters among ethnic 
Albanians, there are also sceptics and opponents among civil society groups in 
Kosovo. Valdete Idrizi, a member of RECOM’s Coordination Council, pointed out 
the need to deal with Kosovo’s context delicately because there had not been much 
headway in dealing with the past – in particular, a lack of dialogue between Albanian 
and Serbian victims’ associations, as well as between these associations and Kosovo’s 
government.18 Similarly, representatives of the international community in Kosovo 
actively discouraged efforts to establish responsibility and accountability, concerned 
that these might be seen by Belgrade as a provocative gesture, at a time when 
goodwill was needed ahead of the status negotiations in 2006 and 2007.19  At the 
Fourth Regional Forum for Transitional Justice in 2008, some Albanian victims’ 
associations expressed reservations towards their participation in the Coalition for 
RECOM, raising concerns about cooperation with other states and the time period 
covered by the commission’s mandate.20  
 
The issue of missing Kosovo Albanians has cast a long shadow over RECOM’s work. 
Serbia’s uncooperative stance in investigating cases of the missing has been taken by 
some Albanians as an argument against participation in the regional initiative – that 
the initiative is not only premature, but constitutes outright cooperation with the 
perpetrator and enemy. The intensity of this feeling that Kosovo should not cooperate 
with anyone, especially Serbia and its civil society, was unequivocally expressed by 
one Albanian NGO: “As before, the servants of Belgrade are manipulating the people, 
especially the families of the missing, falsely stating that the Serbian initiative is 
supported by most Kosovo Albanians, especially the families of victims of the recent 
                                                 
18 Valdete Idrizi, The Kosovo Perspective: The Importance of Ownership, 2 FORUM FOR TRANSITIONAL 
JUSTICE  116 (2009). 
19 Nora V. Weller, ‘The Failure to Face the Past in Relation to Kosovo’, in CONFLICT AND MEMORY: 
BRIDGING THE PAST AND FUTURE IN SOUTH EAST EUROPE 265, 279 (Wolfgang Petritsch and Vedran 
Džihić, eds, 2010). (specifically mentioning the opposition of ‘principal international actors’ in Kosovo 
tothe memory process). 
20 Nataša Kandić, The RECOM Initiative: From a Non-governmental Challenge to a State Project, 2 
FORUM FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 107, 109 (2009). 
conflict in Kosovo.”21 Instead of engaging in a regional dialogue, such groups have 
argued that Kosovo should first start a process of reckoning with the past at the state 
level, spearheaded by the Kosovo government. This call for distance from a regional 
initiative goes to the core of Kosovar Albanians’ quest to establish their political place 
as a nation, whose statehood continues to be denied by Serbia, and is consistent with 
the tendency, which Trix observes in Kosovar Albanians, to view the Milošević trial 
through the prism of their nascent state project.  
 
Simultaneously, the time period to be covered by RECOM proved a sticking point. 
RECOM’s Statute focuses on the period between 1991 and 2001 – the period of open, 
violent conflict from Slovenia to Macedonia.22 Some Albanian representatives argued 
that at least it should begin in 1980, as the year of the death of Tito and the beginning 
of the unravelling of the former Yugoslavia. These calls were backed by references to 
repression in Kosovo during Communist rule, and, in particular, abuse of Albanian 
recruits in the JNA in the 1980s and 1990s. One discussant said, “Here in Kosovo we 
have cases when our youths went to serve the army, and returned as corpses.”23 
Others singled out the early 1990s, which although not a period of armed conflict in 
Kosovo, saw unrelenting state repression under Milošević’s rule, when many 
Albanians were murdered, tortured, or subjected to political and staged trials.24 For 
many Albanians, this period was prologue to the armed conflict in 1998 and 1999, and 
essential to understanding it. Much as in the Milošević trial, the sense that context was 
stripped away has been a source of dissatisfaction with and a basis for resistance to 
the RECOM initiative. Indeed, the critics of RECOM throughout former Yugoslavia 
argue that the establishment of political responsibility for the war is a precondition for 
                                                 
21 Familjet e të zhdukurve kundër fushatës “KOMRA”, SOT, 29 April 2011, 
http://www.kohaditore.com. 
22 Statut Koalicije za REKOM, http://www.zarekom.org/documents/Statut-Koalicije-za-
REKOM.sr.html. 
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KOMRA, 17 December 2010. http://www.zarekom.org/Konsultime/Konsultime-me-shoqatat-e-
viktimave-dhe-familjart-e-viktimave.sq.html. 
24 Forumi i Katërt Rajonal për vendosjen e drejtësisë në shoqëritë post-jugosllave: Komisioni Rajonal 
për vërtetimin e fakteve të krimeve të luftës dhe shkeljeve tjera të rënda të të drejtave të njeriut në ish 
Jugosllavi, 28 and 29 October2008. http://www.zarekom.org/Konsultime/Komisioni-Rajonal-pr-
vrtetimin-e-fakteve-t-krimeve-t-lufts-dhe-shkeljeve-tjera-t-rnda-t-t-drejtave-t-njeriut-n-ish-
Jugosllavi.sq.html.  
establishing the truth, in contrast to RECOM’s approach of focusing on the facts of 
past abuse first.25 
  
At the same time – and unlike Milošević trial – the RECOM initiative’s focus on the 
needs of the victims and their families for truth and justice has assured it a measure of 
grassroots support. It reverses the methodology of trials which, as Trix shows, bury 
the harrowing statements by survivors of atrocities and relatives of victims in the 
background – just as it challenges their sidelining in all post-Yugoslav states. This 
includes Kosovo, where victims have complained about the government’s 
indifference to them, a sense of neglect by Kosovo’s society and institutions that one 
Albanian woman expressed, saying “We have been stripped of our dignity; so far we 
do not feel part of Kosovo society”?26 Despite opposition by some Albanian 
associations and think thanks, the number of signatures that the RECOM has collected 
in Kosovo makes the initiative more successful there, in comparative terms given 
Kosovo’s size – than in other parts of the former Yugoslavia.27  Still, this evidence of 
partial popular support only makes the question of opposition to an initiative focused 
on the victims and spearheaded by local organisations even more pertinent.  
 
III. Back to the Map: Beyond the Mechanisms of Transitional Justice  
 
The experience of RECOM so far suggests that – quite apart from questions of its 
ultimate efficacy – the process has met a mixed reception in Kosovo. RECOM was 
deliberately designed in reaction to critiques of the ICTY – a paradigmatic example of 
international retributive justice whose unfolding is removed from the local setting – 
but even this bottom-up, restorative justice initiative, exclusively shaped by local 
actors driven by an imperative to respond to victims’ needs, has met resistance 
predicated on very similar objections. How can we explain this? 
  
                                                 
25 Anastasijević, op.cit. 
26 Project: Dealing with the Past, 16 November 2010. http://crdp-ks.org/pdwp.  
27 Thanks to Nora Ahmetaj for this observation. Also see Në Kosovë 20 shtande për mbledhjen e 
nënshkrimeve, 6 May 011. http://www.zarekom.org/lajme/N-Kosov-20-shtande-pr-mbledhjen-e-
nnshkrimeve.sq.html. In fact, RECOM was most strongly endorsed in Kosovo, where 100,559 
signatures were collected, as opposed to 254.539 in Serbia, 122.473 in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and 
19,668 in Croatia. Potpisalo 542.660, DANAS, 8 July 2011, 
http://www.danas.rs/danasrs/drustvo/kandic_rekom_pocetkom_2013_.55.html?news_id=219120 
 
The most important consideration in pursuing transitional justice is the context, with 
all its social, historical, cultural and political particularities.28  The observation that 
transitional justice is “constituted by, and constitutive of, the transition”29 reminds us 
to focus on the political environment that shapes the reception and perception of 
efforts aimed at coming to terms with past crimes. In Kosovo, the introduction of 
transitional justice processes – whether international or local – has taken place in an 
environment marked by the legacy of a totalitarian regime and conflict. In particular, 
three aspects of Kosovo’s complex transformation comprise a challenge to any 
transitional justice mechanism: They concern the complex history of crimes in 
relation to Kosovo’s political transformation, the continuing national struggle, and 
victims’ position in narratives of conflict.  
 
The maps of crime are complex. The legacy of crimes passed on to the post-conflict 
authorities in Kosovo has historical, ethnic and ideological dimensions. Given the 
history of Albanian-Serb relations in Kosovo – which both sides see as  a history of 
domination of one group over the other30 – efforts to reckon with war crimes have an 
explicit inter-ethnic dimension. However, as Albanians’ response to Bakalli’s 
testimony in the Milošević trial demonstrates, reckoning also has intra-ethnic and 
ideological dimensions. Kosovo Albanians’ perception of their own former 
Communist leaders is closely intertwined with perceptions of their cooptation in the 
Serb project of domination. Communism waned swiftly in Kosovo in the late 1980s as 
Milošević began his ascent to power through a forceful abolition of Kosovo’s 
autonomy. Nonetheless, Albanian Communists’ alignment with the Albanian national 
movement in Kosovo did not dispel their ambiguous standing in the Albanian 
community: they were seen on the one hand, as modernizers who spearheaded 
Kosovo’s political, economic, and even national development, crowned by its 
provincial status in the 1974 constitution, but on the other hand, as Communist 
cronies who subscribed to the Serbian vision for Kosovo, especially after their 
participation in the violent suppression of the Albanians’ 1981 demonstrations that 
voiced the demand for republican status.  
                                                 
28 RACHEL KERR AND EIRIN KNOEBEKK, PEACE & JUSTICE: SEEKING ACCOUNTABILITY AFTER WAR 10 
(2007). 
29 RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE 6 (2000). 
30 Dušan Janjić, ‘National identity, movement and nationalism of Serbs and Albanians’, in CONFLICT 
OR DIALOGUE: SERBIAN-ALBANIAN RELATIONS AND INTEGRATION OF THE BALKANS 117 ff (Dušan 
Janjić and Shkëlzen Maliqi, eds, 1994). 
 Second, the temporal and political context in which a transitional justice instrument, 
whether retributive or restorative, is introduced may ultimately prove defining for its 
impact. Kosovo’s political status has been contested during the entire period that the 
ICTY and RECOM have been operating. Kosovo’s declaration of independence on 17 
February 2008 – the fulfilment of its ethnic Albanians’ historical striving for national 
sovereignty since Kosovo’s incorporation into Serbia in 1912 – aimed to end the 
ambiguous position Kosovo had found itself in since the adoption of Resolution 1244. 
However, although Kosovar Albanians and the majority of West European states 
consider the question of the status of Kosovo settled, the European Union is unable to 
agree on a recognition policy, and a majority of UN members still do not recognize 
the new state, which is left outside most international institutions.31 Above all, 
Serbia’s refusal to recognize Kosovo has prevented closure of the Serbian-Albanian 
dispute. Most notably, in the north, run by Serbs loyal to Belgrade, Pristina has been 
unable to impose “empirical sovereignty,” understood as effective exercise of 
attributes of statehood.32  
 
This continued contestation means that all crimes are interpreted, and all victims 
perceived, within the context of this struggle; this is as true for the ongoing RECOM 
initiative as it was for the terminated Milošević trial. Rugova’s statements following 
his testimony in the ICTY in 2002 show this linkage between Kosovo’s victims – 
between the ostensible forensic purpose of the trial – and Kosovar Albanians’ political 
quest for independence is explicit.33 Three years after Kosovo’s declaration of 
independence, an analogous linkage helps explain opposition to participation in the 
RECOM initiative, despite its notional focus on local concerns and its attention to 
victims. Victims are not simply people, but factors in a national project – sacrifices: 
Marking the Day of the Missing by a visit to a “Lëndinë e Pikëllimit” (Field of Grief), 
commemorating Albanian victims of Serb violence in the village of Meja, near 
Gjakova, in April 2011, the newly elected President of Kosovo, Atifete Jahjaga 
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33 See Trix at XXX. 
declared that “[t]he freedom and independence of Kosovo is owed to these martyrs 
who have sacrificed themselves so that Kosovo is governed by its people, that Kosovo 
will have democratic institutions and that Kosovo will be an equal and dignified 
country in the European Union.”34 In such a hotly-disputed political context, 
transitional justice becomes another site where national struggle unfolds, rather than 
first and foremost serving the victims. 
 
Such place of victims in the national project has made it difficult to distinguish 
between acknowledging individual victims and their particular suffering, on the one 
hand, and, on the other, asserting victimhood as a collective appropriation which 
allows only one side – one’s own side – to be the victim, while the other is always and 
only a perpetrator, never a victim.35 In this way, “denial of the victims is more 
ideologically rooted in historically interminable narratives of blaming the other.”36 As 
a consequence, Kosovo’s victims – of all ethnicities, but especially Albanians and 
Serbs – are in a paradoxical situation: They are acknowledged by their own 
communities, but simultaneously are subsumed in an exclusive collective claim to 
suffering expressed as opposition to the ethnic other, and by accompanying narratives 
of conflict.  
 
Logically, reckoning with the past at the inter-ethnic level ought to start with de-
collectivization of blame, without denying the scope of complicity in crime. However, 
reckoning with the past also has a critical intra-ethnic side: “[I]ntra-group 
reconciliation implies ‘a group coming to terms with its own history and culture, 
which may have been based on enmity, war thinking or a fixation on its 
‘victimization’ or inherent ‘superiority.’37 In Serbia’s case, this requires the re-
evaluation of its “mythical history” centred on Kosovo, not just to come to terms with 
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the loss of Kosovo,38 but to come to terms with the crimes committed in the name of 
the Serbian nation – the kind of reckoning Demaçi envisions. For Kosovo this 
requires the recognition of discordant voices that question a master narrative of a 
KLA-led struggle for the liberation of Kosovo built on incorporating individual 
victims in a mythic collective martyrdom.39  By overlooking these complex histories – 
including their internal complexities – the pursuit of transitional justice may further 
entrench the sense of victimization steeped in the past, rather than delivering the 
recognition of victims as a way of overcoming the past.  
 
 
In Kosovo, the complex political and historical context, including the unfolding 
double transition from Communism and fromconflict, provides us some insight into 
why transitional justice initiatives – whether judicial or non-judicial, retributive or 
restorative – have left victims unsatisfied. The fear and trauma engendered during 
Kosovo’s protracted transition and conflict, compounded by the indifference of its 
governing institutions and their cooptation as a collective symbol within the national 
project of Kosovo, ultimately has made individuals feel doubtful, anxious and 
insecure about dealing with the past, while simultaneously leading them to take on an 
“only-victim-role[.]”40 The effects of this patterns perceptions of any effort to reckon 
with the past.  
 
Thus the Milošević trial played into the collective nationalism in which the issue of 
war crimes in Kosovo was framed by political elites, both in Kosovo and in Serbia.41 
Consequently, it helped close off whatever possibility might have existed for a cross-
ethnic debate on crimes and violations of human rights. This politicization of the trial 
was aided by the sidelining of victims and their testimonies in the legal process, 
contributing to its perceived failure in Kosovo, as well as further marginalizing 
victims and their suffering.  
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 Similar challenges confront the ongoing RECOM process in Kosovo. Although it is 
organized on radically different principles than the ICTY, and seeks to draw its 
legitimacy from explicitly local sources, the RECOM process has not thereby escaped 
the pitfalls of context and politics. These challenges do not doom the initiative, or 
similar efforts. Precisely because RECOM aims to afford victims and their families 
space to reclaim their individual stories of pain and suffering, it holds the promise of a 
nascent dialogue between the Kosovo’s polarized Albanian and non-Albanian 
communities, essential for mutual solidarity and understanding42 and as a precursor to 
establishing truth and justice. But to be successful, RECOM – indeed any transitional 
justice initiative – will also need to confront and overcome the many incentives, born 
of politics and history, to treat victims as something else. 
 
Victims above Politics: The Transformative Potential of Transitional Justice  
This returns us to the paradox we noted at the outset, which has to do with whether 
the remedies for the flaws of the Milošević trial are legal and procedural, in nature, or 
political. We have seen that neither retributive nor restorative justice mechanisms 
deployed in response to the conflict in Kosovo have been immune to criticism from 
the very stakeholders those mechanisms were meant to serve, and that this criticism 
has a common source: For both types – the ICTY’s Milošević trial and the RECOM 
process – the context in which transitional justice unfolds has been critical in 
explaining its reception. That context has been one of complex, highly varied 
experiences of suffering set against a transformation that cuts across ethnic cleavages. 
If a primary aim of transitional justice is to take account of the needs of the victims, in 
all their diversity and with their varied understandings of truth and interest in redress 
for past wrongs, the evidence mobilised to mount a critique ought to receive particular 
attention.  It ought to take on board the fact that political expectations for transitional 
justice may not coincide with victims’ needs for truth and justice.  
 
This is why Trix’s deployment – really, her conflation – of evidence derived from 
what Albanians’ expectations of the trial were – given Kosovo’s troubled history and 
its unsettled contemporary circumstances – and evidence derived from analysis of the 
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trial proceedings to explain why Milošević’s trial failed to interest Albanians in 
Kosovo, falls short of providing an answer to the question of how the victims of crime 
can be properly respected and accommodated.  
 
For in fact, Trix’s explanation comes very close to prescribing as a solution precisely 
what has been the key obstacle to establishing the truth, particularly concerning the 
role of Serbian society and its pathology in the trial: that solution is, implicitly, a 
collective one. This derives from Trix’s account that Kosovo’s Albanians were 
dissatisfied with the trial because it did not reflect a collective and historic nature of 
Serbian culpability. Ironically, such framing of ineffectiveness of the Milošević trial 
undermines her key finding concerning the value of oral testimonies of victims. The 
victims ought to be heard not to reinforce but precisely to challenge collective 
understanding of culpability and suffering. Above all, therein lies the transformative 
potential of transitional justice. Otherwise, As long as issues of responsibility and 
culpability are presented in collective terms, criminals, as named individuals, will  
effectively be able to hide in plain sight amid the conceptual and discursive 
obfuscation of categories such as nation and society. Indeed, as several other chapters 
show, Milošević himself, while sitting in the dock in The Hague wearing a tricolour 
tie to match the Serbian flag, was at pains to show that it is not only him, but the 
entire Serbian nation, on trial. He was fully aware that the only way for him to defend 
and legitimate his policies and their consequences was to reach out to and represent – 
again as he had effectively done during his rise to power – the nation..  
 
Human suffering is not monolithic, and injustice visits us in many forms. For this 
reason, transitional justice, properly understood, is not monolithic either, but rather 
characterised by a search for effective and legitimate ways to account for the legacy 
of injustice. There are many possible avenues, and no single transitional justice 
instrument can give a full accounting of complex histories of crime – Kosovo is an 
illustrative example of this principle. Indeed, this aspect of transitional justice is 
indirectly indicated by the multiplication of transitional justice instruments.43 Still, for 
all their complexity, one common, critical factor in designing and implementing 
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transitional justice mechanisms is an awareness of the context in which they are 
pursued. But awareness is not the same as acquiescence or advocacy, and arguably 
requires a critical examination of that local context. Responding to local politics – 
especially a politics that marginalizes the victims themselves – may not actually help 
the victims in their quest for truth and justice, as in Kosovo it appears not to have. 
Victims need to be the agents of their own, rather than some national truth. Giving 
more voice to victims, whether in trials or in truth commissions, must be integral to 
any strategy to post-conflict justice. Ironically, cutting out their voices in the 
Milošević trial actually (and perhaps incidentally) did register within Kosovo’s local 
context – but with the wrong kind of local politics, one that sees victims as means 
rather than ends in a quest for justice, itself used instrumentally for political ends.  
 
 
  
  
 
 
 
